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CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVE OF THE REPORT
A global breakthrough by biometrics in security technology seems to be immi-
nent in the form of its use in identity documents and corresponding biometrical-
ly-based controls at frontiers. All over the world, states and groups of states are 
creating the political and legal conditions for this.
The question of which biometric systems and which features are suitable or 
preferable is now much less open than it was only recently. Recognition sys-
tems using fingers, faces or irises (or a combination of these features) have, in 
principle, proved their suitability for applications verifying identity documents, 
although their performance and capability could be improved in some respects, 
depending on the context and system requirements. However, one significant 
dilemma remains for decision-making: the biometric enhancement of national 
ID documents and their global use in border controls constitute a task on such a 
scale that experience to date – e.g. with pilot projects on border controls – can, 
at best, provide only indirect information. In view of the volume of international 
travel and migration and the complexity of the necessary technical, administra-
tive and legal implementation at national level – and a fortiori on a global scale – 
our present state of knowledge and experience is still in a state of flux. At the 
same time, however, there is obvious need for action.
In this situation, an objective of the present TAB report on biometric identifica-
tion systems is to present the current state of discussion. The report is not the 
result of a comprehensive technology assessment, as the review was limited in 
terms of the issues covered, and specifically there was no analysis of consequenc-
es. In accordance with the commission, it summarises the status of scientific and 
political discussion of the capability and suitability of these technologies and 
corresponding systems for specific identity documents and border control ap-
plications, formulates requirements for legally compatible design and addresses 
further need for information, discussion and action. The status report is accord-
ingly intended to assist the work of the committees of the German Bundestag.
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POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND DECISIONS, INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In many countries, tests, pilot projects and feasibility studies – and increasingly 
legislation and regulations – have laid the foundation for biometric enhance-
ment of identity documents and biometric border controls (section II). Many 
countries have already decided on national identity documents with biometry or 
taken the first steps (section III). The USA has for some time been moving towards 
a biometrically-supported system for border entry and exit controls. At EU level 
basic political and legal decisions have been taken, creating the conditions for 
coordinated use of biometry or biometric enhancement of identity documents, 
visas and residence permits for non-EU nationals. In Germany the Passport and 
Personal ID Act and the Aliens Act have been amended accordingly. Additional 
biometric information (face, finger, hand) can now be integrated into identity 
documents for German citizens and aliens. However, further operationalisation 
of modalities and details is required by the legislators and regulators.
The G8 nations constitute a further actor. They intend to create a high-level 
working group under joint US-French leadership to prepare the initial political 
decisions. Large-scale test programmes are being considered for preparation. 
The G8 nations explicitly support the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) and its efforts to standardise biometric procedures.
After long preparatory work, the ICAO (a United Nations specialised agency) 
has issued a recommendation on making inclusion of a facial picture in interna-
tional travel documents, as the first physical characteristic, binding on member 
states. Fingerprints and/or iris images are given as options for nations wishing to 
use biometry for checking with databases.
TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE AND SUITABILITY
The report summarises the state of discussion on the technical performance and 
suitability of hand geometry, fingerprint and face and iris recognition for use 
with identity documents and for verification at border controls. For this pur-
pose, a short general description of the strengths and weaknesses of the individu-
al biometric procedures (section IV.1) is followed by a more detailed description 
of their specific performance profile for identification use (section IV.2).
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A review using various criteria reveals the following situation:
> If IDs are biometrically enhanced, care must be taken to ensure that the pro-
posed feature as far as possible excludes nobody or a very small number of 
citizens from the application. Fingerprint procedures only partly meet this cri-
terion. Tests and experience to date show that problems arise with biometric 
enrolment with around 2% of the total population. While the enrolment failu-
re rate is lower with hand and iris recognition processes than with fingerprints, 
there are still problems with certain user groups due to their age or ethnic 
background. The user failure rate for facial recognition is marginal.
> Hand geometry recognition is relatively less suitable with regard to the require-
ment of discrimination, particularly with extensive application. Discrimination 
is fundamentally better with iris, finger and face, because of the large number 
of unambiguous pieces of information. Solid quality tests demonstrate the high 
degree of uniqueness of the finger and face as features, even with large data 
populations. There is no evidence yet from large-scale applications for the iris.
> For biometric applications, it is important that a feature should not change 
over a short period of time. In terms of stability, the fingerprint process is open 
to criticism because of certain limitations. A drawback with hand geometry 
recognition is that this feature only stabilises late, at the age of 20. The stability 
of the face is sufficient for identification use, as changes in this occur over lon-
ger periods, so that »reregistration« can be done at reasonable input/cost. The 
iris probably has least problems with regard to the criterion of stability.
> Studies to date suggest a high recognition performance for iris recognition pro-
cesses, although this has yet to be checked in large-scale applications. While 
hand geometry recognition showed good recognition rates in small-scale situa-
tions, the problem of the ambiguity in discriminating between hand geometry 
samples in larger-scale applications would need to be settled in large-scale test 
studies. Fingerprint and face recognition processes have demonstrated their re-
cognition performance in current and independent studies, even for large data 
sets. The current performance level of the two processes in verification appli-
cations is roughly equal. Both fingerprint and face recognition processes today 
are sufficiently mature and have sufficient performance capability for their use 
in verification mode to represent an increase in the effectiveness of border con-
trols, compared with the present situation. The question whether the recogniti-
on performance to be expected here will ensure adequate security, and whether 
the anticipated improvement in border controls justifies the expense involved, 
is one which requires political justification and decision. A point for open de-
bate here is that despite impressively low error rates, mass use in practice can 
only result in a relative increase in security, as misidentifications will continue 
to a certain extent.
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> For identification use, processes with low operating cost and high comprehen-
sibility are advantageous. Face recognition processes have advantages here as 
a contactless process without major positioning effort. Fingerprint processes 
are convenient in use, but require a learning period, although this is only short. 
Operating errors are also relatively rare in hand geometry recognition. Iris re-
cognition is comparatively less favourable in terms of the effort involved in 
operation, as it requires exact procedures and some learning time. The effort 
with enrolment and control required with all processes should not make any 
decisive difference in the current time frame for application for an ID and con-
trol processes. However, a comprehensive assessment requires consideration of 
further aspects, such as the system environment and structural, infrastructural 
and organisational aspects. Whether – for example – more time would be re-
quired at the airport for ID controls, or whether biometric procedures could re-
sult in saving time in the longer term depends on the specific system conditions 
and local service requirements.
Each technology has specific strengths and weaknesses. For example, face recog-
nition leads on two criteria (enrolment failure rate, operating effort and compre-
hensibility), but falls behind on recognition performance. Iris recognition leads 
in terms of recognition performance. However, it lags when it comes to operat-
ing effort. Hand geometry recognition has average ratings throughout overall, 
but a high false positive (recognition) rate. Fingerprint recognition does not out-
perform any of the other processes in terms of any single criterion, but has good 
ratings on average, with the exception of the unsatisfactory enrolment failure 
rate.
Overall, we can conclude that three processes – face, iris and fingerprint recogni-
tion – have roughly comparable technical capability. By contrast, hand geometry 
is somewhat lacking. A decision for or against a specific technology requires 
consideration of further criteria and issues.
EFFECTS ON EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR DATA COLLECTION AND 
PRODUCTION
Implementing the goal of biometric modernisation of IDs and ID controls could 
have substantial consequences – for example, a complete collection of biometric 
data for German citizens. If we consider the consequences of various options for 
the limited area of the survey and production processes for passports and IDs, 




In terms of the organisational inputs, the most practicable option with the cur-
rent ID concept and within the context of existing and familiar data collection 
and production processes would be to use photographs of adequate quality 
on the ID for automatic analysis. A template could be generated centrally or 
locally.
For fingerprint, hand geometry and iris recognition processes a complete col-
lection of biometric data for the German population would be required. Decen-
tralised data collection would require equipping all citizen and alien registration 
offices with biometric systems, and training staff in their use. In the case of 
central data collection, generating a template for a fingerprint would require an 
impression of the print. Trained staff would be needed to ensure adequate qual-
ity. Iris and hand geometry recognition require decentralised data collection at 
the registration offices, as the features cannot be filed as raw data and forwarded 
for processing.
While there is extensive experience from large-scale application with collecting 
fingerprints and face recognition, there is a lack of experience of large-scale 
data collection and maintenance for irises and hand geometry. Problems with 
the collection of iris and hand geometry data for the entire population should 
accordingly be carefully considered in advance.
Data storage on the document
The consequences of introducing and using biometry for the established doc-
ument concept can be outlined as follows: There would not be major conse-
quences of storing faces in optical form by printing a photo on the ID, as this 
process is already an established part of ID production. If biometric analysis of 
the face could be based on the photo, there would be no need to store a biom-
etric template. For this, it would be necessary to ensure an adequate standard 
(e.g. ICAO). Storing the photo of the fingerprint requires modification to the ID, 
as the photo would have to be stored in addition to the facial photo. There is, 
however, no provision for this on the current ID.
When integrating a biometric template into the ID using a barcode, a point 
to consider is that the barcode can only be applied during central production. 
There is currently no provision for storing the barcode on the ID.
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Integrating a chip into the ID would involve considerably greater input/expense, 
among other reasons because of the lack of infrastructure (readers). Contact-
less chips could be integrated into the existing document, but not contact-based 
chips. An advantage is that the data can only be entered on the chips when the 
document is issued. Because of the lack of large-scale application and testing, 
no reliable statements can be made yet about security from manipulation and 
durability. Storage in chip form is the process requiring highest inputs because of 
the changes required in production, but it offers greater potential in application.
COSTS
The discussion of costs is still in its infancy. However, we can say that the vari-
ous identification technologies involve hardware and software costs which are 
comparable in scale. We can further say that the biometry components are not 
the decisive cost factor in the overall system. As an initial step in answering the 
question of the total cost (nonrecurring and current) at all levels of the system, 
cost models are explored for various application scenarios (section IV.4).
> Biometric use of existing documents (option 1)
    Here, the passport photos printed on the IDs with facial information on the 
individual are used for biometric analysis. The current application process to-
gether with providing a passport photo would be retained. The main modifica-
tions required would be at the level of issuing the document, with the need to 
standardise the quality of passport photos.
> Technical upgrade to existing documents with biometric data (option 2)
    The data is applied to the ID using storage technology. Possible forms of sto-
rage are barcodes or digital storage components. Alternatives would be central 
entry and processing of biometric features (2a) and decentralised entry and 
processing of biometric features at the individual registration offices (2b).
> The existing document concept is replaced by a completely new one (option 3)
    In this alternative, the document (e.g. smartcards) is enhanced by an electronic 
storage component. This would open up possibilities for combining the general 
use of electronic signatures and possibly be a stimulus for electronic commer-
cial and legal transactions.
A rough estimate of nonrecurring and current annual costs shows the following 
picture:
Option 1 requires 22 million in nonrecurring costs and 4.5 million in current 
costs. Option 2 requires 614 million in nonrecurring costs and 322 million for 
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the decentralised re-entry (variant 2b) and 179 million and 55 million respective-
ly for centralised processing (alternative 2a). Option 3 as the most sophisticated 
technology requires nonrecurring investment of 669 million and 610 million in 
current annual costs.
The cost comparison also shows that options which require decentralised re-en-
try of features and template generation (involving new hardware) involve costs 
which are several times greater than those for alternatives where the extra ex-
pense arises in production of the IDs.
Despite its importance, cost alone is not a sufficient basis for a decision. Further 
aspects – in the sense of a cost-benefit analysis – would have to be considered. A 
provisional review suggests the following considerations:
Assuming that the increase in security is roughly the same for all alternatives, 
arguments in favour of option 1 (face recognition technology) are the low cost, 
the retention of existing processes, and likely greater acceptance among the pop-
ulation. A further consideration is that this option leaves open the possibility 
of moving to other options. Arguments against it are the conservative nature 
of the approach, which does not offer any stimulus to innovation or open up 
additional uses.
Option 2 involves higher costs and raises the issue of the acceptance of full-cov-
erage enrolment of German citizens. Conversely, retaining the family of doc-
uments would maintain a certain continuity, and a higher level of technology 
would be attainable.
Option 3 combines the dimension of security with innovation policy prospects. 
Although it involves the highest costs, the introduction of a modern card would 
probably be an innovative approach which would also trigger economic im-
pacts. For German citizens (and in the medium term for foreign nations resident 
in Germany) this would result in a document which not only allows conven- 
tional authentication but could also be used as the basis for electronic signature 
in electronic commerce.
LEGAL BASIS
The Act to Combat International Terrorism, which entered into force in Janu-
ary 2002, contains an important element in the regulation for the inclusion of 
biometric features in passports and IDs for Germans and IDs for foreigners. The 
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Act provides for the possibility of including features in addition to the photo and 
signature in passports and IDs, including in coded form. At the same time, new 
regulations are making possible the inclusion of such biometric features in IDs 
for foreigners and asylum-seekers. The nature of the biometric features, their 
details, the method of storage, other processing and use will be separately regu-
lated in an implementing act or regulation yet to be promulgated. This expresses 
the intent of the legislature to improve the possibilities for computer-assisted 
identification of individuals based on IDs, among other things to prevent indi-
viduals using documents as identification which belong to people with similar 
appearance. The current legislative basis can be described as follows (section V):
> With respect to the IDs for German citizens, the law states that the biometric 
features may only be read and used to check the authenticity of the document 
and check identity, so that the principle of dedicated use derived from the con-
stitutional right to self-determination with regard to information is adequately 
observed. The situation is very different in the case of »foreigner IDs”. Here, 
provision is made for recording biometric features, but there is a total absence 
of adequately defined purposes. Section 5 (7) of the Aliens Act contains a gene-
ral authorisation for all agencies to process this data in the course of the legiti-
mate functions. This cannot be reconciled with the constitutional requirements 
for dedicated use and specificity.
> The legislature has limited the biometric features concerned to »fingers or 
hands or faces”. This excludes not only other features, but also combinations 
of a number of features. In the current state of the technology, this restriction 
causes problems as it means that under some circumstances the full capability 
of biometric systems cannot be exploited.
> With respect to the selection of the permissible individual biometric features, it 
must be borne in mind that the use of biometric processes can result in additio-
nal sensitive and person-related information. This is why it is necessary to limit 
the risks associated with recording the biometric features. A primary candidate 
for this is avoiding storing raw data.
> The authorisation created by the legislature (without more detail) to integrate 
the features and data into the relevant document in coded form requires exact 
regulation of the question of how the coding is to be done or the biometric 
data are to be authenticated with an electronic signature. In view of the secu-
rity environment required for this, central production of the documents seems 
preferable.
> Storage of the data in a central register is currently precluded by statute for 
German citizens. Storage on the ID would be sufficient to satisfy the purpose 
of the law. The creation of central reference files for aliens is not ruled out by 
law. However, central data storage by public agencies without strictly limited 
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uses poses problems because of the unequal treatment in the sense of section 
3 of the Fundamental Law and the principle of proportionality. Decentralised 
storage of data in a register would, for example, make it possible to use this 
for criminal investigations or in a dragnet. Storage of biometric features in a 
database, access to which is not limited to the individual concerned, poses the 
risk of misuse and creating problems in terms of data protection.
Storage of biometric features of aliens would be acceptable in terms of the con-
stitutional right of self-determination with regard to information, if storage out-
side the ID is at a decentralised or central alien agency, provided that there was 
statutory limitation to data security purposes.
NEED FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, DEBATE AND DECISION
At the level of legislation and regulations, clarification is needed of important as-
pects of implementing legislative regulations to date. The preliminary decisions 
by legislators will probably require new discussion. Here, for example, the situ-
ation has to be considered that the use of biometric data in regulating residence 
rights has so far not been specified. Well-defined use would largely resolve data 
protection concerns, and make the goals of legislation and regulations largely 
transparent.
A further point to be resolved would be whether the limitations of the biome-
tric features involved to »fingers, hands or faces« would continue in future, or 
whether legislation should open up the possibility of a combination of a number 
of features or systems. This could under certain circumstances permit better uti-
lisation of the performance capability of biometric systems.
Given the desirability of protecting biometric data as person-related data, it is 
necessary to constrain the possible consequences associated with its recording. 
As a result, it is desirable to avoid storage of the raw data, and to ensure com-
pliance with the principle of data parsimony.
Storage of the data in a central register is currently precluded by statute for Ger-
man citizens, although the establishment of central databases for aliens is not. 
Such centralised data storage would, however, involve problems in terms of data 
protection. This also applies to storage in decentralised registers. A question to 
be resolved is the relationship between AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identifica-




There is need for political debate and action due to the fact that comprehensive 
implementation steps at all levels require planning and consideration of their im-
plications at all levels, from issue through to control level. Further coordination 
processes at EU level and ultimately globally are required, if the goal is to achieve 
greater security without unreasonably impacting on global travel and data pro-
tection concerns. Another significant factor is likely to be the presence of German 
representatives on the committees of the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
and the EU, to provide their own input and defend national interests.
Consideration of the political, financial and organisational consequences of intro-
ducing and using biometric identification systems at all levels is still in its infancy. 
Comprehensive impact analyses would be appropriate here to provide guidance 
for political and data protection input for the developments currently in progress.
A comprehensive and complex project such as the biometric measurement of all 
German citizens and millions of aliens travelling to Europe or seeking asylum rais-
es the question of acceptance. Considerations of technical practicability should ac-
cordingly be supplemented by the issue of societal acceptability. Numerous ques-
tions – for which there are so far few clear answers – would have to be addressed 
in a transparent public discourse. Greater clarity and a more nuanced approach 
are needed in particular for the question of what contributions which biometric 
documents can and should make to achieving which goals.
In the light of this discussion, consideration should further be given to the compar-
ing the suitability of technical solutions and the justifiability of the different costs. 
A particularly important point here is to make clear that biometry can only make 
a limited contribution to improving security. Biometry is a technological approach 
for prevention and control, which means it is only one element (although an im-
portant one) in a broader strategy.
Public discussion is also needed in the conflict between security on the one hand 
and the goals of protecting privacy and limiting potential abuse on the other hand, 
which should also be reduced by technical and legal measures.
Finally, debate and decision should be expanded to include questions and objec-
tives of innovation policy, working with developers and suppliers to formulate 
strategies aiming at the technological progression from the current document con-
cept to a smartcard-based solution. For German companies, which are already 
well positioned in international competition, such a technically and societally 
innovative project opens up prospects of achieving competitive advantages with 
their own products and services.
11
SUMMARY
A transparent public discourse could be a way of creating awareness of the impor-
tance of the dynamics of the societal and technological development involved in 
future intensive use of biometry.
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